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Optimal Bidding Strategies for Thermal and
Generic Programming Units in the Day-Ahead
Electricity Market
F.-Javier Heredia, Marcos J. Rider, Member, IEEE, and Cristina Corchero
Abstract—This study has developed a stochastic programming
model that integrates the day-ahead optimal bidding problem with
the most recent regulation rules of the Iberian Electricity Market
(MIBEL) for bilateral contracts (BC), with a special considera-
tion for the new mechanism to balance the competition of the pro-
duction market, namely virtual power plant (VPP) auctions. The
model allows a price-taking generation company (GenCo) to de-
cide on the unit commitment of the thermal units, the economic
dispatch of the BCs between the thermal units and the generic pro-
gramming unit (GPU), and the optimal sale/purchase bids for all
units (thermal and generic), by observing the MIBEL regulation.
The uncertainty of the spot prices has been represented through
scenario sets built from the most recent real data using scenario
reduction techniques. The model has been solved using real data
from a Spanish generation company and spot prices, and the re-
sults have been reported and analyzed.
Index Terms—Bilateral contracts, electricity spot market,
optimal bidding strategies, short-term electricity generation plan-
ning, stochastic programming, virtual power plant auctions.
NOTATION
The following are the notations used throughout this paper.
Sets:
Set of hourly intervals.
Set of scenarios.
Set of bilateral contracts.
Set of thermal generation units.
Set of scenarios with conditioned accepted GPU’s
sale bid.
Set of scenarios with conditioned accepted GPU’s
purchase bid.
Set of initial condition of unit commitment binary
variables.
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Feasible set of the equivalent thermal-matched
energy constraints.
Feasible set of the equivalent generic-matched
sale energy constraints.
Feasible set of the equivalent generic-matched
purchase energy constraints.
Feasible set of the equivalent generic-matched
residual energy constraints.
Constants:
Probability of scenario .
Base procurement cost of unit .
Linear procurement cost of unit .
Quadratic procurement cost of unit .
Bilateral-free day-ahead matched energy, unit ,
hour , scenario (MWh).
Energy of the BC in hour (MWh).
Unit profit of the BC in hour .
Unit profit of the sale BC after the day-ahead
market .
Maximum energy that can be sold through the BC
after the day-ahead market (MWh).
Unit cost of the purchase BC after the day-ahead
market .
Maximum energy that can be purchased through
the BC after the day-ahead market (MWh).
Virtual power plant exercise price .
Capacity of the virtual power plant (MWh).
Maximum generation of unit (MW).
Minimum generation of unit (MW).
Start-up cost of unit .
Shut-down cost of unit .
Initial state of unit (hours).
Operational minimum in service time of unit
(hours).
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Operational minimum idle time of unit (hours).
Day-ahead (spot) market price in hour , scenario
.
Functions:




Generation of unit in hour allocated to the
BC (MWh).
Virtual power plant capacity used in hour
(MWh).
Generic programming unit’s generation in hour
allocated to the BC (MWh).
Auxiliary variable used in the definition of the
sale-matched energy of the GPU.
Auxiliary variable used in the definition of the
purchase-matched energy of the GPU.
Auxiliary variable used in the definition of the
residual purchase-matched energy of the GPU.
First-Stage Binary Variables:
Equal to 1 if the VPP rights are exercised, 0
otherwise.
Equal to 1 if the thermal unit must be
committed in hour , 0 otherwise.
Equal to 1 if the thermal unit must be turned-on
in hour , 0 otherwise.
Equal to 1 if the thermal unit must be shut-down
in hour , 0 otherwise.
Auxiliary variable used in the definition of the
sale-matched energy of the GPU.
Auxiliary variable used in the definition of the
purchase-matched energy of the GPU.
Auxiliary variable used in the definition of the
residual purchase-matched energy of the GPU.
Second-Stage Continuous Variables:
Auxiliary variables used in the definition of the
matched energy of the thermal units at period
, scenario .
Sale BC after the day-ahead market in hour
and scenario (MWh).
Purchase BC after the day-ahead market in hour
and scenario (MWh).
Total thermal generation of unit in hour ,
scenario (MWh).
Matched energy of thermal unit in hour ,
scenario (MWh).
Sale-matched energy of the GPU in hour ,
scenario (MWh).
Purchase-matched energy of the GPU in hour
and scenario (MWh).
Residual purchase-matched energy of the GPU
in hour and scenario (MWh).
Second-Stage Binary Variables:
Auxiliary variables used in the definition of the
matched energy of the thermal units in hour ,
scenario .
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE new rules of the electrical energy production marketoperation of the Iberian Electricity Market MIBEL (main-
land Spanish and Portuguese systems), for the daily and intra-
daily market from June 2007 [1], have introduced mechanisms
to encourage competition in the production market (physical fu-
tures contracts, bilateral contracts (BCs) and virtual power plant
(VPP) capacity), and have brought new challenges to the mod-
eling and optimization of the market operation.
To increase the proportion of electricity that is purchased
through BCs with a duration of several months and to stimu-
late liquidity in forward electricity markets, the Royal Decree
1634/2006, dated December 29, 2006 [2], has imposed the
requirement of holding a series of five auctions offering VPP
capacity to any party that is a member of the MIBEL, on Endesa
and Iberdrola (the two dominant utility companies in the Spanish
electricity market). In 2006, the total installed capacity of both
the companies was around 47 GW, and the total installed capacity
of the Spanish electricity system was 78.3 GW. Fig. 1 shows the
volumes to be auctioned by Endesa and Iberdrola with respect to
the Royal Decree 1634/2006. It can be observed that the greatest
volumes of auctioned VPP capacity were reached from April to
September 2008, with a total amount of 2000 MW [3].
Further experience of the application of VPP auctions can be
found in France, where the Electricité de France (EDF), since
September 2001, has made available 5.4 GW of generation ca-
pacity in France to facilitate the liberalization of the French elec-
tricity market [4]. On July 4, 2003, the Belgian Competition
Council approved various transactions leading to the appoint-
ment of Electrabel Customer Solutions, a subsidiary of Elec-
trabel, as the default supplier for the customers of several in-
termunicipal distribution companies, subject to certain under-
takings. As a part of these undertakings, Electrabel has agreed
to offer up to a maximum of 1.2 GW of VPP capacity in Bel-
gium to the actual or potential competitors [5]. On September
19, 2007, E.ON Sales & Trading GmbH (EST) offered 250 MW
of the VPP product in a first auction to the electricity market in
Germany. EST is believed to consider conducting further auc-
tions for one or more similar products on an annual basis [6].
In Spain, the VPP capacity indicates that the buyer of this
product will have the capacity to generate MWh at his disposal.
The buyer can exercise the right to produce against an exercise
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Fig. 1. Five auctions of the VPP capacity of the Spanish peninsular electricity
market.
price, set in advance, by paying an option premium. Hence, al-
though Endesa and Iberdrola still own the power plants, part of
their production capacity will be at the disposal of the buyers of
VPP, who are the subjects of our study. There will be base-load
and peak-load contracts with different strike prices that are de-
fined a month before the auction. In each case, contracts with
the duration of three, six, and twelve months will be offered.
Furthermore, all the products will be offered simultaneously
using an electronic auction. Fig. 2 shows the evolution of the
day-ahead market price of day (daily maximum, mean,
and minimum) from July 2007 to April 2008, and the four first
pre-defined strike price for base- and peak-load VPP capacity,
respectively. The energy resulting from the exercise of the VPP
options can be used by the buyers both to contribute to cover the
national and international BCs prior to the day-ahead market as
well as to sell it to the day-ahead market. In this latter case, the
unmatched VPP energy, if any, can be sold through national BCs
after the day-ahead market. These new BCs after the day-ahead
market are negotiated between the agents prior to day-ahead
market gate closure, and must not be confused with other sub-
sequent markets such as the reserve or balancing markets (see
[1] and [7]).
A. Literature Review
The VPP capacity auctions attempt to reduce the influence
of the dominant agents through financial tools to increase the
competition in the market. This kind of regulation aims to move
towards a perfectly competitive market which is achieved by all
price-taking operators. Because of those reasons and the fact
that it is very difficult to model the influence of a price-maker
operator in the clearing price, the majority of the publications
are focused on price-taking generation companies. The gen-
eral considerations about the bidding process in these electricity
markets can be found in [8]–[10].
Several authors have proposed optimal bidding models in the
day-ahead market for thermal units under the price-taker as-
sumption, with or without BCs. The authors in [11] presented a
Fig. 2. Spanish day-ahead price market and strike price for the base- and peak-







mixed integer programming model to optimize the production
scheduling of a single unit with a simple bidding strategy. The
approximation of the step-wise bidding curves by linear func-
tions based on the marginal costs was already considered in [12]
and [13], although in a context without BCs. In [14], the concept
of price-power function, which is similar to the matched energy
function defined in this paper, was used to derive the optimal
offer curves of a hydrothermal system under the assumption that
the spot prices for the day-ahead and reserve markets behave
as a Markov chain. The mixed-integer stochastic programming
model presented in [15] distinguishes between the variables cor-
responding to the bid energy and those representing the matched
energy, although in a price-maker framework and without BCs.
An earlier model [16] is found to be closely related in some
aspects to the one presented in this study, where a stochastic
unit commitment problem with BC is solved by maximizing the
day-ahead market benefit. Stochasticity in the spot prices is in-
troduced through a set of scenarios, giving rise to a two-stage
stochastic programming problem. In [17], the authors presented
a mixed-integer stochastic optimization model for scheduling
thermal units, where the production plans were optimized in the
presence of stochastic market clearing prices. Nevertheless, the
models in [16] and [17] did not propose any explicit modeling
of the optimal bidding. To our knowledge, there are no publica-
tions that consider either the BCs after the day-ahead market or
the modeling of the VPP.
Regarding the risk in the short-term horizon, there are authors
who have included it in the optimization models [14] and other
studies that have not considered introducing risk [16]. Usually,
the latter approaches consider risk as something that must be
taken into account in the mid-term horizon jointly with other
mid-term strategies, such as fuel or derivatives contracts [18].
In this work, we have focused on the optimal bidding model
corresponding to a given BC portfolio; thus, we consider that
risk has been hedged when developing this contract portfolio.
B. Contributions
This study has developed a stochastic mixed-integer
quadratic programming model for a price-taking genera-
tion company (GenCo) that has acquired VPP capacity options.
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The energy of the VPP options is integrated into the MIBEL’s
energy production system through the so-called generic pro-
gramming unit (GPU)1 which will be described in the next
section. The objective of this work has been to find the optimal
bidding strategy of both the thermal production units and the
GPU in the Spanish day-ahead electricity market under the
most recent MIBEL regulation regarding the BCs rules. The
model allows a price-taking generation company to decide
about the unit commitment of its thermal units, the economic
dispatch of the BCs between the thermal and generic units, and
the optimal bid for both thermal and generic units, based on the
MIBEL regulation. The model has been tested with the real data
from a Spanish generation company and spot-market prices. It
has been implemented with AMPL and solved with CPLEX.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• a new model for the optimal thermal bid function and
matched energy which takes into account the presence of
BCs;
• the mathematical modeling of the GPU and the VPP;
• the modeling of the optimal bid functions and matched en-
ergy of the GPU;
• the inclusion in the optimization model of the BCs after the
day-ahead market;
• the consideration of the most recent regulations of the
MIBEL energy market.
The GPU and VPP are the new elements in the MIBEL, whose
utilities need to be integrated into their daily optimal bid policy.
These elements have not been considered previously in the litera-
ture. The model presented is the first attempt both to use and ana-
lyze these novel elements aiming to encourage the competition in
the MIBEL, and can be of great economic interest for any GenCo
operating a GPU. Regarding the VPP, the model provides the
GenCo with a tool to decide if the energy rights of the VPP should
be nominated or not. Regarding the GPU, the model’s output de-
termines its optimal bid to the market and the participation in the
BCs. The numerical experiments presented in Section V show
that this optimal bid policy can increase the day-ahead market
benefits of a GenCo operating a GPU at 10% or even more for a
GenCo holding the VPP capacity.
Finally, it must be mentioned that another relevant novelty of
the paper is the consideration, for the first time to our knowl-
edge, of the BCs after the day-ahead market, which is another
characteristic of the MIBEL.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes
the MIBEL’s energy production system around the day-ahead
market and the relevance of the GPU. In Section III, the sto-
chastic programming model for the optimal bidding strategy is
developed. In Section IV, the market price scenario generation
procedure is described. In Section V, a detailed case study is
presented and solved with the proposed stochastic program-
ming model, reporting and analyzing the computational results.
Finally, some relevant conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. MIBEL’S ENERGY PRODUCTION SYSTEM
The day-ahead market is not only the main physical energy
market of Portugal and Spain in terms of the amount of traded
1Translation of “unidad de programación genérica”, the official Spanish term
used in the MIBEL’s documentation [1].
Fig. 3. GenCo’s operation problem on the MIBEL’s energy production system
around the day-ahead (D-a) market.
energy, but also the mechanism through which other energy
products, such as BCs, are integrated into the MIBEL’s energy
production system. Fig. 3 depicts the elements of the MIBEL’s
energy production system relevant to the decision-making
problem of a GenCo that owns the VPP options. These ele-
ments are:
• The programming units owned by the GenCo (nodes in the
dashed area). These units could be either physical (thermal,
nuclear, combined-cycle, hydro, pump units) or generic,
i.e., virtual units through which the GenCo can operate by
either selling or buying energy, by both bidding to the pool
and settling BC with the other participant in the MIBEL’s
energy production system.
• The pool (day-ahead market node) to which all the pro-
gramming units of the GenCo can submit sale bids (phys-
ical production units), purchase bids (pump units), or both
sale/purchase bids (the generic units). The allowed bids are
represented in Fig. 3 by the thick arcs.
• There are two agents that interact with the GenCo’s pro-
gramming units: the International agents and the MIBEL
agents. The GenCo can buy/sell energy from/to the sur-
rounding foreign generation areas—namely, Portugal,
Morocco, and France—through the international BCs
settled with its GPU. There are also BCs signed both by
the GPU and the physical production units with the rest of
the MIBEL agents. These BCs can be of two kinds: before
the day-ahead market (continuous arcs in Fig. 3) and after
the day-ahead market (dashed arcs). The characteristics of
these BCs are explained in Section III-A.
A. Bids to the Day-Ahead Market
The thick arcs in Fig. 3 correspond to the possible sale/pur-
chase bids submitted to the day-ahead market of day D. In the
MIBEL, this market consists of a series of 24-h auctions that are
cleared simultaneously between 10:00 and 10:30 h of the pre-
vious day (D-1). Selling and buying agents must submit their
sale/purchase bids to each auction before 10:00 h of D-1. Both
sale and purchase bids are composed of up to 25 price-energy
pairs with nonincreasing price values and each agent is unaware
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of the bids of the rest of the agents. The thermal production units
engaged in dispatching the BCs are allowed to offer the nondis-
patched part of its total capacity to the pool. The clearing price
of each hourly auction is determined by the intersection of
the aggregated offer and demand curves. All the sale/purchase
bids with a lower/greater bid price are matched and will be re-
munerated at the same clearing price irrespective of the orig-
inal bid price.
B. Bilateral Contracts
BCs are agreements to provide a given amount of electrical
energy at a stipulated price along with a delivery period. The
characteristics of the BC (energy, price and delivering period)
are negotiated among the MIBEL agents before the day-ahead
market, either in organized or nonorganized markets. There are
two organized BC markets in the MIBEL, the CESUR and VPP
auctions ([19] and [3], respectively). On day D-3, the CESUR
auction settles the BCs signed by generation and distribution
companies to supply power at regulated prices in the peninsula.
The distribution auction generic unit (see Fig. 3) is used by the
GenCo to integrate the energy matched by the CESUR auction
into the energy production system. By law, a GenCo holding
such a BC must use this generic unit to submit a purchase bid
at the maximum technical price to the day-ahead market for the
entire amount of the contract, and therefore, there is no room for
optimization. The VPP auctions have already been described in
Section I. The exercised energy of the VPP is integrated into the
energy production system through the GPU. This GPU brings
more flexibility to the GenCo operations in the MIBEL, because
with the GPU, the utility can:
• integrate the VPP exercised energy into the energy produc-
tion system, both offering this energy to the pool through
sales bids and allocating it among the GenCo’s portfolio of
national and international BCs;
• act as a purchase agent, both sending purchase bids to the
pool and acquiring energy through national and interna-
tional BCs.
In nonorganized BC markets, the producers and consumers
agree on the amount, price, and period of the energy delivered.
This agreement is set during a private negotiation. For a GenCo,
these BCs usually represent a scheduled load curve, chargeable
at a fixed price that has to be optimally dispatched among the
GenCo’s units. In the case of BCs before the day-ahead market,
the resulting dispatch must be communicated (nominated using
the MIBEL’s terminology) to the system and market operator
no later than 25 min before the closure of the day-ahead market
(thin solid lines in Fig. 3). For the BCs after the day-ahead
market, the dispatch must be nominated within 30 min following
the publication of the day-ahead market clearing results (dashed
lines in Fig. 3). After market clearing, the generation program
of the GPU must be allocated among the GenCo’s physical
production units and BCs, in such a way that the net energy
balance of the GPU is zero. The existence of BCs after the
day-ahead market prevents violation of the aforementioned net-
ting energy balance condition as a consequence of possible un-
matched GPU’s sale or purchase bids.
Fig. 4. Case study.
III. STOCHASTIC PROGRAMMING MODEL
Fig. 4 represents the part of the whole MIBEL energy produc-
tion system (Fig. 3) considered in this study. This system will
be modeled based on the following assumptions:
• The GenCo is a price-taker operating in the MIBEL with a
set of thermal units (coal, nuclear, gas, oil) and a GPU.
• The thermal units in have linear or convex quadratic gen-
eration cost function, constant start-up/shut-down costs,
and minimum generation/down time.
• The GPU is associated with a VPP with known capacity
and exercise price .
• Both thermal units and GPU bid to the
hourly auctions of the day-ahead market.
The stochasticity of the spot price , is represented
by a set of scenarios.
• There is a portfolio of BCs duties before the day-ahead
market with the rest of the MIBEL agents, with known
energy and price .
• There is an agreement for selling (purchasing) BCs after
the day-ahead market up to a quantity
at a price . We assume that
it is not possible to obtain net gain from those contracts
.
The objective of this study is to determine how to optimally
manage the thermal units and the GPU, to obtain the max-
imum benefit from the day-ahead market while covering the
BCs agreements. This problem has been modeled in this work
as a mixed integer quadratic two-stage stochastic optimization
problem. Among the complete list of the variables of this model
(see the Notation section), the main information provided by the
model (here and now decisions or first-stage variables) for each
period are as follows:
• For each thermal unit , the unit commitment ,
the energy allocated to each BC, and the
optimal sale bids, expressed as a function of (see
Section III-C).
• For the GPU, the exercised VPP energy , the en-
ergy allocated to the BCs before the day-ahead market
, and the optimal sale/purchase bids, ex-
pressed in terms of and (see Section III-D).
It must be noted that following the explanation given in
Section II, all these variables represent quantities that the
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GenCo has to decide on before the day-ahead market clearing,
and thus, must be associated with the first-stage variables.
The model presented in this study has been tuned to incorpo-
rate the specificities of the MIBEL energy production system,
namely, the BCs after the day-ahead market, the integration
of the nominated bilateral contracts into the sale thermal bid,
and the capability of the GPU to submit purchase bids. Never-
theless, apart from the aforementioned characteristics, the pro-
posed model could also be of interest for other electricity mar-
kets with VPP, such as the Belgian and German markets.
A. Bilateral Contracts Constraints
The GenCo has agreed to physically provide the energy
amounts at hour of day D for each one of the
BCs with the rest of the MIBEL participants. This energy
can be provided both by the real thermal units and the virtual
GPU
(1)
B. Thermal Unit Commitment
Following [20], (2) can be used to formulate the minimum up
and down times for thermal unit
(2)
where (2a) and (2b) define the auxiliary binary variables and
to be iff and , and
iff and . Subsequently, the minimum in
service and idle times are guaranteed by (2b) and
(2c), respectively. represents the value of the variables ,
and set by the initial state of the thermal units at the
beginning of day D. An alternative formulation of the thermal
unit commitment constraints can be found in [21], where only
variable is used at the expense of increasing the number of
constraints by more than twice.
C. Optimal Thermal Bidding Model
In the MIBEL, a simple day-ahead sale bid consists of a
stepwise nondecreasing curve defined with up to 25 price-en-
ergy blocks. Similar to [12], this stepwise sale bid will be ap-
proximated in our model through the optimal thermal bid func-
tion , which is a discontinuous linear piecewise nonde-
creasing function that gives the value of the optimal bid price
at which the thermal generation would be bid at the th
day-ahead auction. It can be shown that under the price-taker
assumption and the MIBEL bid rules, the optimal thermal bid
function, i.e., the bid function that maximizes the day-ahead
benefit function for any given value , regardless of the value
of the clearing price, can be expressed as [22] (3) at the bottom
of the page, where , and are
the minimum and maximum generation capacity of the thermal
unit , respectively. The variable , which is the total energy
production of unit assigned to the whole portfolio of BCs, is
defined as
(4)
Equation (3) can be interpreted with the help of Fig. 5 that
represents the optimal thermal bid function (thick line) corre-
sponding to four representative values of the BCs energy .
• Case a): This is the case when (the committed
thermal unit doesn’t contribute to the BC covering)
which coincides with the classical self-commitment
problem treated by several authors [11], [12]. In this
case, it is well known that the optimal bid strategy for a
price-taking GenCo is to bid at the true marginal cost of
the unit. By assuming a quadratic thermal generation cost
, the optimal bidding
policy consists of an instrumental sale bid up
to the operational minimum limit to guarantee their ac-
ceptance, and the rest of the plant capacity at the marginal
price , which is the slope of the cost function
. If this sale bid is submitted to the pool, then the
bilateral-free day-ahead matched energy under scenario ,





where is the unconstrained max-
imum of the benefit function
(6)
for a given thermal unit , period and scenario . It must
be noted that are constant parameters of the model.
if
if (3)
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Fig. 5. Representation of the optimal thermal bid function       .
• Cases b) and c): In both the cases, the energy to be
allocated to the BCs is below the bilateral-free day-ahead
matched energy but strictly positive. The MIBEL
rules exclude this allocated energy from the sale bid
of the thermal unit, giving rise to the optimal bid curve
associated with the second coordinate system of Fig. 5(b)
and (c) (thick line), starting at , a value of the original
x-axis. In both the cases, the matched energy will be the
difference .
• Cases d): In this last case the allocated energy exceeds
the quantity . By looking at the optimal bid curve, it
can be observed that the minimum price asked from the
market is greater than the repre-
sented spot price and consequently, the sale bid will
remain unmatched.
The thermal matched energy function under scenario
associated with the optimal thermal bidding function (3) (also
called price-power function in [14]) was derived in [22], and




This discontinuous and nondifferentiable function can be alter-
natively formulated as a system of linear constraints, called the
equivalent thermal-matched energy constraints, with a feasible
region represented by the polyhedron (see Appendix A)
(8)
where and are a set of continuous and binary auxiliary
variables, respectively. Finally, we can define the second-stage
variables that represent the total generation of the thermal
unit at period conditioned to scenario , expressed as
(9)
D. Optimal Generic Programming Unit Bidding Model
In this section, the optimal bidding and the matched energy
functions for a GPU will be derived. First, variable represents
the total contribution of the GPU to the coverage of the BCs
before the day-ahead market:
(10)
Second, we assume that , the exercised energy of the VPP,
depends on the value of the binary variable as follows:
(11)
Under this assumption, the expression of the optimal GPU bid
function can be developed by analyzing the two cases,
and :
• : VPP rights are not exercised and the energy
must be either acquired from the pool or provided by the
BCs after the day-ahead market at an agreed price ,
which is the maximum price that we were willing to pay
to the pool for that amount of energy. Therefore, the op-
timal purchase bid (energy, price) pair is
if (12)
• : the VPP rights are exercised and the exercise
price is paid. Subsequently, two different situations must
be considered:
— : After covering the energy with the VPP,
there is an energy surplus of that can be sold
either to the pool, at unknown spot price , or to the
BCs after the day-ahead market, at known sale price .
Subsequently, the energy surplus should be offered to
the pool at a price not less than , which is the optimal
sale bid
if and (13)
— : analogously to the case , to fulfill the
uncovered part of the BCs duty, the following optimal
purchase bid must be submitted:
if and (14)
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As a result of the preceding analysis, the optimal sale and pur-




It can be easily verified that for any given value of the first stage
variables and , (15) and (16) correspond to the optimal
bidding rules developed in (12)–(14). Equations (15) and (16)
can be used to derive the expressions of the matched energy at
each scenario , as functions of the first stage variables
and . First, consider the two following sets of scenarios:
(17)
The set includes those scenarios where, at the th day-
ahead auction, the optimal sale bid (14), if any, will be accepted.
Then, with respect to (15), the matched sale energy function
will be (18) at the bottom of the page. Analogously the set
includes those scenarios where, at the th day-ahead auc-
tion, the optimal purchase bid (16), if any, will be accepted. For
the clarity of the exposition, the two terms of the total matched
purchase energy of (16) will be represented by two separate
matched functions, the matched purchase energy function in
(19) at the bottom of the page and the residual matched pur-
chase energy function in (20) at the bottom of the page.
On observing (18), (19), and (20), it becomes evident that
actually, the value of the matched sale energy will be the same
for any scenario in , and the same happens with the matched
purchase energies and the scenarios in . Nevertheless, the
superscript “ ” will be conserved for the sake of clarity and to
strengthen the fact that these are actually second-stage variables,
as there will be scenarios with nonzero matched energies, while
in others, those energies will be zero. Another issue to mention
is that, as we have assumed that , the intersection set
(21)
could be nonempty. This fact does not reveal any inconsistency
of the model, because (18), (19), and (20) are formulated in a
way that, for any , only the matched sale energy
or the total matched purchase energy can be greater
than zero, but never simultaneously. Hence, for those scenarios
in , only a sale bid or a purchase bid will be submitted,
depending on the value of the variables and .
Each one of the three nondifferential functions (18), (19),
and (20) can be conveniently incorporated into the optimiza-
tion model through an associated system of equivalent generic
matched energy constraints, which is a system of linear con-
straints with feasible polyhedrons denoted, respectively, by ,
and (see Appendix A):
(22)
where and are a set of continuous and binary auxil-
iary variables, respectively. The vector are defined as
, and and are defined
analogously.
E. Generic Programming Unit’s Net Energy Balance
At every hour, any GPU operating in the MIBEL must satisfy
, such that the net energy balance of the GPU must be zero,
with the help, if necessary, of the BCs after the day-ahead market
(see Section III). Following this rule, we assume that, for each
scenario , the energies and are purchased and
sold through these new BCs up to a given maximum quantity
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The expected value of the benefit function can be expressed
as (24)–(28) at the bottom of the page. Equation (24) represents
the total income of the BCs before the day-ahead market (con-
stant) and can be ignored in the optimization. However, (25)
does not depend on the realization of the random variable ,
and corresponds to the on/off fixed cost of the unit commitment
and the exercise cost of the VPP energy. Equations (26)–(28)
are the expected value of the benefit coming from the day-ahead
market’s bids of the thermal units (26), the day-ahead market’s
bids of the GPU (27), and the BCs after the day-ahead market
(28), respectively. All the functions in (25)–(28) are linear, ex-
cept for the generation costs of the thermal units (26), which are
concave quadratic ( ; see Table II).
G. Final Model
The final model developed in the previous sections is shown
in (29) at the bottom of the page with respect to the parameters
and sets defined in (5) and (17).
Equation (29) represents the deterministic equivalent pro-
gram [30] associated with the proposed two-stage stochastic
problem with a set of scenarios for the spot price , where
. The methodology followed to obtain the set of
scenarios will be presented in Section IV. This deterministic
equivalent program corresponds to a mixed continuous-bi-
nary linearly constrained maximization problem with concave
quadratic objective function. As will be illustrated in Section V,
this kind of optimization problems can be solved with the help
of standard optimization software, as it is usually carried out in
other works on this area (e.g., see [7] and [11]).
IV. MARKET PRICE SCENARIO GENERATION
The two-stage stochastic model (29) requires the characteri-
zation of the market price through a set of scenarios, also known
as a scenario fan. Many scenario generation methods are avail-
able (see [26] or [27] for a review on them).
The creation of new BCs and the application of VPP auctions
started in June 2007. As the behavior of the prices depends on
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Fig. 6. Expected benefit value and difference between the expected benefit of
the complete set and each reduced one, as function of the number of scenarios.
has been obtained using all the available market prices from
June 2007 [27].
Given that the size and computational cost of the stochastic
programming models depends on the number of scenarios, some
scenario reduction techniques have to be applied to reduce the
original set of scenarios into a smaller but representative one.
We have applied the scenario reduction algorithm explained in
[28], which determines a subset of the initial scenario set and
assigns new probabilities to the preserved scenarios. For other
approaches, see [29].
In our model, a scenario was a set of 24-hourly market prices.
The original number of scenarios was 261. The reduction tech-
nique was applied resulting in subsets of 10, 25, 50, 75, 100,
150, 200, and 250 scenarios. Fig. 6 shows how the optimal ob-
jective function value changes as the number of scenarios in-
creases. It also contains (right axis) the difference in the per-
centage between the expected benefits of the complete group
of 261 scenarios and each reduced set . It
can be observed that, from 75 scenarios up, any additional in-
crease in the number of scenarios improved the expected ben-
efits by less than 0.09%, while the CPU time increased by al-
most 14 times (from 442 s with 75 scenarios to 6554 s with 100
scenarios). As a consequence, model (29) was tested by a fan
with 75 scenarios, for which the objective function value be-
came stable and the computational time cost remained accept-
able.
In Table I the stochastic programming indicators needed to
evaluate the advantage of the stochastic approximation [30] are
reported. EEV is the expected benefit of using the optimal so-
lution of the deterministic problem, where the random vari-
ables have been replaced by its mean. RP is the expected ben-
efit of the stochastic problem. Indicator VSS is computed as
, and represents a measure of the advan-
tage of using a stochastic programming model instead of a de-
terministic one. This indicator shows that it is possible to in-
crease the expected benefits by 52.636 , by using the stochastic
optimal solution. Therefore, we can conclude that the solution
obtained through the stochastic programming model increases





OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THERMAL UNITS
TABLE III
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BILATERAL CONTRACTS
TABLE IV
CHARACTERISTIC OF THE VPP CAPACITY
AND THE BC AFTER DAY-AHEAD MARKET
V. TEST AND RESULTS
The model (29) has been tested using real data from a Spanish
generation company and market prices [23], and the results are
reported in this section. The study date was Monday, May 5,
2008. As explained in the earlier sections, a fan with 75 sce-
narios has been used to represent the spot-price stochasticity.
The characteristics of the thermal units, BCs, and VPP capacity
are shown in Tables II–IV, respectively. The model (29) has
been implemented in AMPL [24] and solved with CPLEX [25]
(called with default options) using a SunFire X2200 with two
dual core AMD Opteron 2222 processors at 3 GHz and 32 Gb
of RAM memory.
A set of computational tests were performed to evaluate the
influence of the GPU and VPP in the GenCo’s optimal bidding
strategy in the MIBEL. For this reason, the proposed stochastic
programming model was tested for three different cases: a) a
GenCo with GPU and VPP capacity; b) a GenCo with GPU
but without VPP capacity; and c) a GenCo without GPU (see
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TABLE V
OPTIMIZATION CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDY CASES
Table V for a summary of the optimization problem’s dimen-
sions and solutions). The worst expected profit was obtained in
case c), where the thermal units were the only ones with the re-
sponsibility for fulfilling the BC before the day-ahead market.
Case b) obtained a greater expected profit than case c), owing to
the possibility of being able to buy cheaper energy from the pool
to cover the BC and to avoid the use of expensive thermal units.
The greatest expected profit was obtained in case a), where the
VPP capacity was used to sell in the day-ahead market and to
cover part of the BC, using the same advantages of case b).
The optimal management of the GPU in case a) can be an-
alyzed with the help of Figs. 7 and 8. Fig. 7 shows the aggre-
gated economic dispatch of the two BCs (1.500 MWh) by the
thermal units ( , white bars) and the GPU ( , black bars), to-
gether with the exercised VPP energy (small circles). Fig. 8
shows the optimal GPU’s sale bid ( , positive values) and
purchase bid ( , negative values) for both cases a) and
b) (black and white bars, respectively). On observing both the
graphs along the whole 24-h optimization horizon, it is clear
that the GPU exhibits a differentiated behavior depending on
the time period considered:
• In the time periods , the GenCo does not ex-
ercise its VPP rights . For those time periods, all
the energy allocated to the BC must be purchased in
the day-ahead market (purchase bids, black negative bars
in Fig. 8) or from the BC after the day-ahead market. For
the rest of the time periods, the GenCo does exercise its
VPP rights completely .
• There is only one time period where the exer-
cised energy coincides with the energy allocated to the BC
.
• For periods the allocated energy exceeds
the exercised one . The surplus energy,
must be obtained either from the day-ahead market (see the
purchase bids for those time periods, black negative bars in
Fig. 8) or from the BC after the day-ahead market.
• For periods , only part
of the exercised VPP energy is used to satisfy the BC, and
the rest is submitted to the day-ahead market (sale bids for
those time periods, black positive bars in Fig. 8).
Case b) corresponds to those GenCos operating in the
MIBEL, which are not allowed to acquire any VPP capacity
rights to prevent these GenCos from becoming price-makers.
Under the assumptions of model (29), such a GenCo can use the
GPU to purchase energy from the day-ahead market at its best
convenience, resulting in an optimal purchase bid pattern that is
depicted by the white bars in Fig. 8. The energy of the optimal
purchase bid coincides in this case with the contribution of the
GPU to the BC at each time period, .
Fig. 7. Aggregated economic dispatch of the two BCs between the thermal
units and the GPU for the study case a). Exercised VPP energy is also shown.
Fig. 8. Sold and bought optimal bidding of the GPU for the study cases a) and
b).
Finally, the optimal thermal unit’s bidding is analyzed. The
thick line in Fig. 9 shows the optimal thermal bid function
of the three thermal units (3, 4, and 6) for all the
case studies in each hour. It must be noted that is the energy
allocated to the BC in such a way that the submitted bidding
comprises energies between and . The symbol is used
to point out the BC contribution for the remaining hours not
shown explicitly in each sub-figure. From Fig. 9, it is clear
that the presence of the GPU and VPP capacity allows the
thermal units to submit more energy to the pool. For instance,
consider the extreme case of thermal unit 3: without GPU [case
c)], the generation of this unit is exclusively dedicated to the
BC , while with GPU and VPP capacity [case
a)], all the production output within the operation limits are
submitted to the pool . The rest of the thermal
units exhibit a similar behavior. It can also be observed as
to how the availability of the GPU allows the bidding of the
thermal unit 6 to adapt itself to the different periods in contrast
to case c), where the bidding is almost identical in all the time
periods. In general, Fig. 9 shows that the optimal thermal unit’s
bidding is affected significantly when a GPU is considered,
which drastically changes the optimal bidding in a nontrivial
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Fig. 9. Bidding curve of thermal production units 3, 4, and 6 for all the case studies. Shadowed zones are regions with a high concentration of values of   . (a)
Case a). (b) Case b). (c) Case c).
way that increases the opportunity of the GenCo to take benefits
from the pool.
Finally, we present a comment on the unsuitability of the pro-
posed model to assess the optimal bid of the GenCo in the VPP
auction, based on an estimation of the additional profit expec-
tation from holding the VPP. It must be noticed that although a
GenCo can use the proposed model to evaluate the expected in-
crease in the profit over a 1-day period, through the direct com-
parison between the expected benefits of the study cases a) and
b) in Table V, the products auctioned in the VPP market are en-
ergy delivered over six months and one year. In other words, in
order to evaluate the overall expected increase in the benefits,
it would be necessary to use mid-term optimization models and
not a short-term optimization model such as the one presented
in the paper.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides a procedure for a price-taking genera-
tion company operating under the most recent regulations of the
MIBEL Iberian Electricity Market, to optimally manage a pool
of thermal production units and a GPU. The proposed technique
has been developed within the versatile decision framework pro-
vided by the stochastic programming methodology. A two-stage
stochastic mixed quadratic programming problem has been pro-
posed to decide on the optimal unit commitment of the thermal
units, the optimal economic dispatch of the BCs between the
thermal production units and a GPU and the optimal bid for
thermal production units and a GPU observing the MIBEL reg-
ulation. The objective of the producers is to maximize the ex-
pected profit from their involvement in the spot market, BCs and
VPP capacity. The set of scenarios representing the uncertainty
of the spot prices are built by applying reduction techniques to
the tree obtained from the real data of the MIBEL system. The
model was implemented and solved with commercial optimiza-
tion packages, and tested using the real data of a Spanish gener-
ation company and market prices. The results of the computa-
tional experiments were reported and analyzed, which demon-
strated that the optimal bid policy furnished by the proposed
model can increase the day-ahead market benefits of a GenCo
operating a GPU at 10% [case study b) of Table V] or even more,
holding a VPP capacity [case study a) of Table V].
APPENDIX
EQUIVALENT MATCHED ENERGY CONSTRAINTS





Fig. 10 represents the function (thick line and
dot), for a fixed value of the spot price . Although function
is discontinuous and nondifferentiable, it can be
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Fig. 10. Thermal matched energy function   for a fixed spot price  .
formulated as a system of linear constraints called equivalent
thermal-matched energy constraints. With the help of the auxil-
iary variables (binary) and (continuous) (see Fig. 10), the
nondifferentiable expression (30) can be shown to be equivalent
to the following mixed-integer linear system:
(31)
with a feasible polyhedron denoted by . The equivalence
between (30) and (31) indicates that, for every possible value
of and , there is a unique feasible value of the matched
energy with respect to (31), and that this value satisfies (30).
This result has been demonstrated in [22].
In a similar fashion, in Section III-D, the matched sale en-
ergy function , matched purchase energy function and
Fig. 11. GPU-matched sale energy function (32a) for     .
residual matched purchase energy function associated with
the GPU were defined as (32)–(34) at the bottom of the page.
These three nondifferential functions (32), (33), (34) can be
conveniently incorporated into the optimization model through
an equivalent mixed-linear modeling. First, consider (32), which
expresses the matched sale energy as a function of vari-
ables and (see Fig. 11 for a graphical representation of
this function). This nondifferential expression can be included
into the optimization model through the equivalent set of linear
constraints, using the auxiliary variables (continuous) and
(binary) shown in (35) at the bottom of the page, and where
the constant parameter
(36)
that represents the total energy of the BCs at interval , is used
as a trivial upper bound of the variable . We denote the fea-
sible polyhedron of (35) by . The equivalence between (32)
and (35) can be easily observed, in the sense that for every pos-
sible combination of the values of variables and , the
value uniquely assigned by (35) to the matched sale energy vari-
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Fig. 12. GPU-matched purchase energy function (33a) for      .
both (32) and (35) zeroes . We analyzed the equiv-
alency for the remaining scenarios :
• When the nominated VPP energy is , (35c) sets
and , which coincides with the value of the
matched sale energy function associated with (32). The rest
of the system (35) is reduced to the redundant condition
.
• In case , if , the value of the matched
sale energy function (32) will be .
It is easy to verify that when , (35d) and (35f)
sets and , and consequently, by (35b),
, which is the same value given by the
function (32). The remaining equations of the system (35)
provide redundant bounds.
• Finally, when and , expression (32)
gives . By assuming , the only
feasible value of permitted by (35e) is , which,
together with (35c), determines . The rest of the
system (35) derives redundant expressions.
By applying a similar analysis to the expression of the
matched purchase energy function (33), represented graphi-
cally in Fig. 12, it is possible to verify the equivalence between
expression (33) and the system of linear constraints (37), with
feasible region ; see (37) at the bottom of the page, where
again, the auxiliary variables (continuous) and (binary)
were introduced. Finally, proceeding in a similar way, the
Fig. 13. GPU residual matched purchase energy function (34a) for      .
residual matched-purchase energy function (34), represented in
Fig. 13, is introduced in the model through the following set of
equivalent linear constraints:
(38)
with a feasible polyhedron denoted by . Again, (contin-
uous) and (binary) represent auxiliary variables.
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